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外国人労働者が企業について不完全な情報をもつ
もとでの外国人労働者の受け入れの影響
島 田 　 章
Abstract
We investigate the effects of immigrants on the economy comprised
of substitute and complement industries when immigrants do not have
complete information about their employers．For this purpose, we as-
sume that wages are determined according to the efficiency wage
hypothesis and that immigrants are substitutes for native workers in the
substitute industry and complements to native workers in the comple-
ment industry．We also assume that immigrants do not know their
working hours exactly．We show that it is likely that in the substitute
(complement) industry native worker utility increases (decreases)
and the profit of the firms decreases (increases) as more immigrants
are accepted． These results are contrasted with those derived when
there is no asymmetry of information between firms and immigrants．
In other words, when information is symmetric, the native worker utili-
ty becomes lower (higher) and the profit of the firms becomes larger
(smaller) in the substitute (complement) industry with increases in
the number of immigrants．Our results suggest that even in the case
where immigrants do not have complete information, the conflicting re-
lation of interests between native workers and firms are affected by the
availability of information as well as by the relation of native workers
and immigrants as factors of production.
Keywords: immigrants; asymmetric information; efficiency wage
hypothesis; working hours; substitute industry; complement industry
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国ともよぶ）は，自国を除く世界（rest of the world，本論文の以下では外
国とよぶ）と労働移動をつうじて関係している．
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